Tag Archives: Section 512

Wiley copyright imbroglio at science blog

Last week a copyright imbroglio broke out at a science blog which had written a post critiquing mainstream coverage of a science article; the blog had posted a figure from the paper to demonstrate bad science writing in the mainstream media. Wiley sent a C&D; the blogger agreed to take the material down (actually took the data and recreated the figures herself) but posted about the incident; a blogstorm erupted (see also coturnix); THEN Wiley apologized … and the blogger as far as I can tell just left her own recreated figures on the blog post, and who can blame her? It’s a (relative) pain in the ass loading images on a blog.

So some good will come out of this incident: that a bajillion people will have heard the words “fair use” and been inspired to participate in discussions about open content, fair use, control of information, etc.

I really, really hope that people do *not* take the lesson that if the publisher had not apologized and “granted permission” that the original figures would have had to stay down. This was a classic example of the chilling effect that comes from cease and desist letters. In other words, a classic example of the growth of copyright paranoia.

The law is actually on the blogger’s side on this issue. That blogger would have been well within rights to completely ignore the C&D to begin with because this was as fair use (as many people pointed out). Wiley would have then had to do a s.512 notice to the ISP (scienceblogs.com) which would also have been within its rights to ignore the notice. They could have then filed a 512(f) suit against Wiley for a bad faith s.512 notice, and EFF or any number of attorneys would have been delighted to take them on as pro bono clients, I’m certain.

My point: These incidents raise questions about the growth of copyright and whether copyright should be usefully applied to certain kinds of knowledge and how public investments in scientific research should be monitored. But they also raise simple questions of the abuse and misuse of copyright law — misuse which is illegal in some circumstances and can cost the misuser a lot of money.

I’d like to see in-house counsel advising their “junior staff” about the possible liability for misusing its copyrights. A few more high-profile cases might put that in their list of important topics to cover in their in-house trainings.

WSJ editorial page embarrassment

The WSJ editorial page is not something I ordinarily frequent, but they recently wrote an editorial on the DMCA. Aside from a reflexive and simplistic “intellectual property is good so don’t bother me with nuance or details” attitude, this paragraph struck me:

Google claims “a legal safe harbor” from copyright infringement under the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which allows Internet firms to provide a thumbnail of copyrighted material. The firm also asserts a right to reproduce and distribute intellectual property without permission as long as it promptly stops the trespass if the copyright owner objects. That’s like saying you have the legal right to hop over your neighbors’ fence and swim in their pool — unless they complain.

WSJ 2006/12/1 (it’s the editorial page so the person who actually penned this embarrassment doesn’t have to sign his or her name)

I realize that editorial pages don’t require fact-checking, but getting the law this wrong is embarrassing. Readers of this blog probably are very familiar with the DMCA, but a couple of quick pointers:

  1. The DMCA doesn’t “allow[] Internet firms to provide a thumbnail of copyrighted material.” I believe the hopelessly inept WSJ editor was probably thinking about the Kelly v. Arriba 9th Cir. decision, supported recently by the 2d Cir. decision in Dorling-Kindersley. Both of those interpreted fair use (17 USC 107) to include offering thumbnails for a different purpose.
  2. “… without permission as long as it promptly stops the trespass if the copyright owner objects.” Presumably here they’re talking about the DMCA notice-and-takedown provisions, 17 USC 512. Of course, these provisions don’t apply to original infringement — reproduction and distribution — but to the responsibility of ISPs and other intermediaries when their networks are used for reproduction and distribution. That is, at best, secondary infringement (contributing to or vicariously responsible for someone else’s infringement), and it’s really not at all clear that ISPs would be liable for it even in the absence of the safe harbor provisions. Which aren’t “claimed” by Google et al but ”given” to them by Congress.

Since they can’t be bothered to do even the barest minimum of fact checking, and don’t understand what they’re talking about, it’s hard to actually take them seriously. Are they this bad all the time?

Gigi Sohn of Public Knowledge probably very wisely didn’t bother correcting their extremely shoddy fact-checking but responded to the overall tenor of their arguments; the WSJ published their letter – and because the WSJ puts their content behind passwords, the full-text of the letter is available at PK’s blog by Alex Curtis.